The main goal of this project is to gather data that helps us understand the political effects of cash transfers. For this purpose, we designed a survey to be administered in the Brazilian municipality of Maricà. We target Maricà specifically to evaluate a unique policy, the Renda Bàsica de Cidadania (RBC). The RBC is a monthly cash transfer of approx. R$170 (US$31) per person. All households with an income below 3 times the minimum wage (3 × R$ 1100) are eligible. We are specifically interested in how the program changed the citizen-government relationship. On the one hand cash transfers which reduce vulnerability are expected to decrease clientelism on the other hand other corrupt activities may replace clientelism when people have more cash on hand. Importantly, perceptions on corruption in general relate to political participation and public support for democracy, which is historically low in Brazil, especially among the poor and vulnerable. Yet, successful programmatic social policies can raise participation and democratic support. Political effects of cash transfers are generally difficult to estimate, since most transfer programs are transitory not permanent like the RBC. We leverage the the eligibility threshold of the RBC, a quasi-exogenous cut-off, which allows us to apply causal inference methods. Since the RBC is financed through oil royalties our research will be informative for the prominent “resource-curse” literature. In this respect we will be able to provide tangible policy conclusions on whether the RBC is feasible model for spending resource revenues.